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Abstract
The research aimed to determine the efficacy and integrity of several hard-drive disk deletion tools on solid state drives
(SSDs). SSDs contain new technologies such as wear-levelling and device under provisioning to provide efficient
functionality and speed for data management, but the same technologies may also provide obstacles to ensuring that all
information is fully removed from the drive. Furthermore SSDs stores files in 4KB pages, yet data can only be deleted in
512KB blocks. This function uses the disk controller to remove all the pages from the block a file is being deleted from,
storing the pages in a disk controlled cache. Once the whole block has been reset, the valid data is retrieved from the
cache and replaced on an available block. The reset block is added to the SSDs free space. The specific purpose of this
paper was to discover if any data was recovered, especially from the disk controlled cache while testing various tools and
methods for their effectiveness of securely wiping data off SSDs. All tools except the GNU core utility DD left some file
information which was recovered, though none of the recovered files was loadable. Additionally, the paper introduces the
concept of the TRIM functionality and provides a baseline further research into this feature. Finally, a comparison of
methods for securely deleting Solid State Drives is provided.
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INTRODUCTION
Solid state drives (SSD) are gaining market share as the technology becomes more stable and as prices fall (Monroe &
Unsworth, 2009). An additional driver for increased uptake of these drives is the release of Windows 7, which contains
native support for solid state drives (Silver et al, 2009). Unlike common hard-drives which use an electrical stepper
motor, a platter of cylindrical disks and read/write heads positioned on arms between the platters, SSDs use NAND flash
memory (Shimpi, 2009b). As a result of this electrical rather than mechanical storage, these drives produce no sound and
very little heat. One of the biggest differentiators from a digital forensics point of view is that they store data differently
than mechanical drives, as is illustrated in this paper.
Since SSDs store data differently to common platter-based hard drives, they also delete data using different methods.
Instead of new data being written over the top of old data which has been flagged as free space on a platter-based HDD, a
SSD needs to reset the cells that contain the data to be deleted. Only then does the disk controller index these cells as free
space. SSDs utilise a disk controller, which uses techniques such as wear-levelling and a cache to delete data. The
principle purpose of this research is to discover if any data or files are recoverable from a SSD after it has been securely
deleted, possibly still residing in the cache. A secondary purpose is to test a number of secure deletion techniques and
tools on a SSD to see how effective they are at securely wiping information from a SSD. Thirdly, the paper introduces
the concept of the TRIM functionality and creates a baseline for further research into this feature.

DATA STORAGE AND DELETION ON SOLID STATE DRIVES
As was mentioned in the introduction of this paper, solid state dives store and handle data very differently than
mechanical drives. This mostly has to do with the fact that mechanical drives are optimised to for read and write speeds
based on a rotating mechanism and the associated geometry. This rotation introduces the concept and subsequent delay
known as seek time, and access methods and algorithms are optimised to minimise this time. With solid state drives, data
can be effectively be accessed with a seek time approaching zero, as there is no delay whilst the required address on the
platter is located through rotation and movement of the read / write head. The following sections outlines data is stored
and deleted on solid state drives.
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How Solid State Drives Store Data
NAND flash memory at its basic construct is one transistor per cell. A charge is applied to the cell to change its state
from a ‘1’ to a ‘0’ (Gerbarg, 2009). The smallest groups of cells recognized are called pages, typically 4 kilobytes (KB)
in size. Files are typically written to an SSD in pages. Pages are then grouped into blocks, commonly 128 pages to a
block (512KB). Blocks are the smallest structure that can be deleted on a Solid State Drive (SDD). Typically 1024 blocks
constitute a plane (512 megabytes (MB) and multiple planes reside on a single NAND flash die. Finally, multiple die
may be embedded inside a single Integrated Circuit. (Shimpi, 2009a)
SSDs are also available as Single Level Cells (SLC) or Multi-Level Cells (MLC). A SLC stores one bit or two states per
cell, representing a 1 or 0. MLCs typically store two bits or four states per cell (mp3Car.com, 2009).
The NAND flash memory is allocated and indexed by the disk controller. Controllers translate instructions from the host
operating system and file allocation table to the physical NAND media, such as standard ATA commands of read /write
into flash read / writes (mp3car). ATA views a SSD as a series of Logical Block Addresses (LBAs) (Gerbarg, 2009). The
controller determines how the LBAs map to the NAND flash pages (Shimpi, 2009c). Additionally the disk controller can
handle 6 to 12 NAND die’s simultaneously, which means the controller can read / write to more than one NAND die at a
time (mp3Car.com, 2009)
Since SSDs has a MTFB (mean time between failure), typically of 10,000 -100,000 writes per cell (mp3car), it is
important that all the available NAND Flash memory is evenly utilized. By writing to a certain section repeatedly will
possibly reduce the life of the device. Hence SSDs use wear-levelling, which intends to write data to every available page
before a single page is re-used or more importantly, deleted. (“Intel Solid State Drives”, n.d) Wear-levelling is an
algorithm run by the SSD controller that evenly spreads data across all the pages of the NAND flash, for the purpose of
increasing the overall endurance of the whole drive beyond the endurance of a single NAND cell. The SSD controller
keeps a track of all free-space within the drive and will not actually delete any data until all available free pages have
been utilized, even if the files have been deleted within the file system. This is what gives SSDs their amazingly quick
write and delete speeds.
Additionally, SSD’s commonly under provision the amount of storage media available to the host operating system. An
important difference between HDDs and SSDs, is that a 32 gigabyte (GB) SSD contain 32GB of NAND flash cells or
34,359,738,370 (32x1024^3) bytes. Whereas platter-based HDD makers believe 32GB means 32,000,000,000 bytes (or
approximately 29.8GB). Operating systems still recognise a SSD as having the same amount of available space as a HDD
(29.8GB in the case of a 32GB SSD) and the SSD controller assumes control of the additional space as available spare
space (2.2GB in the case of a 32GB SSD) (Shimpi, 2009e). The SSD controller utilises this additional free space to save
files, reducing the need for the deletion of blocks and keeping the drive at peak performance.
Data Deletion on solid state drives
A Solid State Drive (SSD) controller only begins to delete data when it starts to run out of free space or pages which do
not contain any data, either referenced or deleted by the host operating system. Pages that no longer contain data
referenced by the host operating system are marked as invalid by the disk controller (Gerbarg, 2009). This is when the
amazing write speeds of SSDs decrease, as the SSD needs to create free space before writing the new data to the storage
medium.
As mentioned before, files are saved on a SSD in pages, typically 4KB in size. Pages are then grouped into blocks. While
data can be written to individual pages, data can only be deleted in blocks (Shimpi, 2009b). Multiple files (stored in
pages) can be contained in a block, yet a block is the smallest element that can be deleted, thus special techniques have
been developed to overcome this problem.
SSDs utilize a cache when they need to create free space. The location of the cache is typically on a die within the SSD
(mp3Car.com, 2009). As new data is written to the SSD, the disk controller needs to create more free space or pages. To
do this, the new data is written to free pages. The data from the block containing the most invalid page/s to be deleted is
placed into the cache and the all the cells in the block are reset to ‘1’ (Gerbarg, 2009). Then in the cache, the deleted
pages are removed from the block, leaving only the valid pages. Finally, the block of data is transferred from the cache to
an available block. The newly reset block is added to the controllers free space (Shimpi, 2009d).
As stated in the introduction, the main purpose of this research is to discover if any data or files are recoverable from a
SSD after it has been securely deleted, possibly still residing in the cache. A secondary purpose is to test a number of
secure deletion techniques and tools on a SSDD to see how effective they are at secure deleting information from a SSD.
A third purpose of this paper is to introduce the Trim functionality and create a baseline for further research into this
feature.
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The TRIM Function
Another technique utilised by SSD controllers make the resetting of blocks more efficient is the TRIM Functionality.
TRIM works differently from the method described above as the actual TRIM command is an ATA command made by
the host operating system, which is recognised by the disk controller. Hence when a file is deleted within the host
operating system, a TRIM command is sent to the disk controller with the associated LBAs (Logical Block Addresses)
for the deleted file, informing the controller those LBAs are no longer needed and maybe cleaned as per the process
above. The SSD then resets those blocks which become additional free space. The repercussions of the TRIM
functionality are that the write performance of the SSD should not decrease to the same extent (Shampi, 2009f).
While TRIM functionality is becoming more prevalent, now available in operating systems such as Linux and Windows
7, SSD manufacturers are slowly introducing firmware and controllers that will utilize such a feature. At the time of
testing for this paper, the only manufacturer producing SSD’s with controllers supporting TRIM functionality were Intel
badged SSD’s. Since then other manufacturers, such as OCZ, Crucial and SuperTalent have released updated firmware
with TRIM functionality for some of their SSDs.
Unfortunately, access to a SSD with TRIM functionality was not available for this research.
Secure File Deletion
Secure deletion or disk wiping is a method used to actually remove data from a physical storage medium. When a file is
deleted by an Operating System, information of that file such as where it is located on the physical device in the file
allocation table is removed. But the data is still physically written to storage medium, until the same physical medium is
written over with new information (Mallery, 2006). The same situation applies to SSDs.
Secure Deletion or disk wiping tools write all 0’s, 1’s or pseudo-random data (Mallery, 2006) to all or most of the drive
depending on the tool used. Some tools write data to the whole drive, while others target certain sections of the drive
such as unallocated or free space. These are sectors or blocks which are not currently allocated to any data by the
operating system or file allocation table, which may contain recoverable data (Mallery, 2006). A secondary purpose of
this research is to test a number of secure deletion techniques and tools on a SSD to see how effective they are at securely
deleting information from a SSD.

METHODOLOGY
This research included two tests, with only a subtle difference between the two tests. In the first test, a SSD was filled
with data to the maximum size as allowed by the operating system. Some data was deleted, and more added. In the
second test, the same SSD was filled to the maximum size allowed by the operating system. Then a large amount of data
was deleted from the SSD and a significant amount of data was added to the SSD, so that the total amount of data written
in the experiment to the drive was larger than the total advertised size of the SSD.
For test one, the DD application was used on the SSD and all bits were written to zero and then was filled to the SSDs
referenced capacity with a range of files, both in file type and size. A number of files were then deleted from the drive
and removed from the Trash. Additionally, a single large file was added to the drive.
The drive was then wiped using the process of a specific secure deletion or wiping tool. Then again using the DD
command, a bitwise image was recovered off the drive. Finally, the recovered image was input into Scalpel, which
returned any recovered files. This process was repeated for each specific Wiping Tool.
For test two, this process was repeated again, with the only significant change being the amount of data saved and deleted
from the SSD. Since SSDs utilise wear-levelling and under provision the available storage media to the operating system,
the disk controller keeps a percentage of the total storage area un-index by the host operating system to keep the SSD
running at peak performance. In this test the SSD was filled to the capacity of the drive, and then a significant amount of
data was deleted and more data added to the drive to fill all the NAND flash memory to over the advertised full size of
the drive.
The purpose for deleting and adding additional data to the SSD for each test was to induce the use of the cache for
creating free space on the drive. The intent for the two separate tests was to discover if there were any significant
differences in the recovery of files between filling the SSD with data to the referenced capacity and filling the SSD with
data over the advertised size of the drive.
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TEST METHODOLOGY
The test environment consisted of a single quad core computer, with 4GB of random access memory, running both
Windows 7 Professional and Ubuntu 8.10 32 bit versions. A 32GB PQI SATA II 2.5 inch Solid State Drive was used as
the target drive for the experiments and testing. The model number of the drive was S525 and the firmware version was
02.10104. The computer was restarted (cold booted) when moving from one operating environment to the other.
Windows 7 was utilised for formatting the SSD with NTFS and transferring / deleting files on the SSD. Once the files
had been deleted from the SSD, they were also removed from the Recycle Bin. Ubuntu was utilised for zeroing the SSD
between tests using the DD command, recovering bitwise images of the SSD after the wiping tools and finally running
the file carving tool scalpel. The SSD was automatically mounted on both Operating Systems as SSD_Test.
A range of secure deletion and wiping tools were utilised during the tests. The four tools employed a range of methods to
wipe the data and ran on either the Windows 7 or Ubuntu 8.04 Operating Systems. These tools were:
DD (GNU core utility)
The DD command is a terminal run application which is part of the GNU core utilities, installed on most distributions of
Linux. This application can be used to create bitwise images, copy files and convert raw data into either zeros or random
data. (MacKenzie, 2009)
The following command was used in an Ubuntu 8.04 terminal window to securely wipe the SSD for this research
(MacKenzie, 2009):
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdb bs=1M
if=/dev/zero - means to overwrite the device with null bytes.
of=/dev/sdb – means the device to overwrite will be the Solid State Drive sdb.
bs=1M – block size of 1 Binary Mb or 1,048,576 bytes.

Eraser (version 5.8.7)
Eraser is a security tool created for Windows. Eraser is able to securely wipe individual files and folders, as well as
securely wipe unallocated or free space as well as slack space. This space includes sections of a drive that do not have a
file allocated in the file system, but may still contain recoverable data (Mallery, 2006).
For this research, the secure wiping of unused space was utilised. After all the files had been added to the SSD, they were
deleted by selecting all files, right clicking and selecting the delete option. The drive SSD_Test then displayed as empty.
Finally Eraser was tasked to securely wipe all the free space from SSD_Test, the SSD.
Wipe
Wipe is a Linux based secure file wiping tool that writes random data. Wipe typically uses more than one pass to remove
files but for this research only one pass was used, since the other tools only used one pass.
Wipe was installed on Ubuntu 8.04 using the following command in a terminal window:
sudo apt-get install wipe

And the following command was also given in the terminal window
sudo wipe –q –Q 1 /dev/sdb
-q = quick wipe option, default four passes of random data (man2html, 2003)
-Q 1 = Set number of pass for quick wiping as 1 (man2html, 2003)
/dev/sdb = SSD to be wiped

SDelete
SDelete is a command line application for use in Windows, made available by Microsoft from their TechNet site
(Russinovich, 2006).It is a secure delete application that can be used to wipe existing files as well as any file data in
unallocated space, such as non-referenced but recoverable data. SDelete implements the US Department of Defence
Standard (DOD 5220.22-M) for cleaning and sanitizing data. An known issue with SDelete is that while it securely
deletes file data, it misses the file names located in free space. (Russinovich, 2006)
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For this research, the secure wiping of unused space was utilised. After all the files had been added to the SSD, they were
deleted by selecting all files, right clicking and selecting the delete option. The drive SSD_Test then displayed as empty.
SDelete was downloaded and the unzipped contents were place in s folder on the C drive called SDelete. Next a
command prompt was opened and navigated to the C:\SDelete folder. The following command was then input into the
command prompt: (“Data Clean Up: Secure Delete”, n.d)
sdelete –z d:
-z = wipe free space
d: = the mounted location of SSD_Test in Windows 7

Scalpel
Scalpel is a fast file carver based on the application foremost 0.69. It is file-system independent, able to carve files that
match a database of file type headers and footers and extract those files from Windows, Linux and raw partitions
(“Scalpel: A Frugal, High Performance File Carver”, n.d).
Scalpel was installed on the Ubuntu 8. 04 Operating System using the following command in a terminal window:
sudo apt-get install scalpel

Scalpel was run on each image using the following command in a terminal window (wipingtool was substituted for the
wiping tool used before the image was created):
sudo scalpel /wipingtool.img –o /home/me/Desktop/wipingtool/

-o = location of Scalpel output..
Each time scalpel was run, a number of folders were created in the output location containing the recovered files.
Test One
The 32GB SSD, once formatted with NTFS, showed 29.8GB of available space. The SSD was filled with a variety of
files ranging in file-type and size. These are shown in Table 1 in summary form:
Table1: File types and size added to SSD_Test1
File Type

Extension

Number of files

Total Size

Smallest File Largest File

74
10
4
60

21.8GB

1.6MB

1.4GB

.mpg
.wmv
.avi
Word Files

.doc

109

23.3MB

20KB

8.9MB

Zip Files

.zip

5

1.38MB

48KB

590KB

Text Files

.txt

11

48KB

1KB

6KB

Powerpoint
Files

.ppt

14

31MB

166KB

21.129MB

318
1
1
316

196MB

2KB

5.397MB

.bmp
.gif
.jpg
.pdf

103

715MB

8KB

648.93MB

1068
99
244
725

6.91GB

28KB

45.13MB

.wma
.mpg4
.mp3
.xls

7

336KB

14KB

102KB

Video Files

Image Files

PDF Files
Music Files

Excel Files
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A number of files were then deleted from the SSD and also from the Trash Can again summarised in (Table 2).
Table 2: Files deleted from SSD_Test
Filetype

Size

.avi

1.15GB

263MB

.pdf

27.5KB

15MB

.mp3

14MB

.wma

5.9MB

.txt

1KB

1KB

.doc

22KB

32KB

80KB

A 1.1GB .avi file was then saved to the SSD. After each tool was run on the SSD, a bitwise forensic image was created
of the contents of SSD_Test using the Linux dd application with the following command (wipingtool was changed with
the name of the tool used):
sudo dd if=/dev/sdb of=/home/me/Desktop/wipingtool.img

The resulting image was then carved by Scalpel to discover if any files were recoverable from the device.
Test Two
In test two the same tools, methods and SSD were utilised. Additionally the same original 29.8GB of data were added to
the drive. The following files were than deleted from the solid state drive, totalling over 3.6GB.
Table 3: Files deleted from SSD_Test
Filetype
Size
.avi

1.15GB

263MB

.pdf

27.5KB

15MB

80KB

.mp3

14MB

45.1MB

44MB

.wma

5.9MB

.txt

1KB

1KB

.doc

22KB

32KB

.jpg

5.4MB

3.9MB

.avi

698MB

1.36MB

And the following files were finally added to the SSD, totalling 3.39GB. This amounted, when added to the original data
added to the drive, total 33.19GB, more than the advertised total size of the SSD of 32GB.
Table 4: Additional files added to SSD_Test
Filetype
Size
.avi

1.11GB

.avi

703MB

.wmv

1.59GB

Once again, after each tool was run on the SSD, a bitwise image was created of the contents of SSD_Test using the Linux
DD application with the following command (wipingtool was changed with the name of the tool used):
sudo dd if=/dev/sdb of=/home/me/Desktop/wipingtool_2.img

The resulting image was then carved by Scalpel to discover if any files were recoverable.
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RESULTS
For both tests One and Two, a number of files were carved by Scalpel from each tool except DD. Scalpel was unable to
carve any files from the DD images from either experiment. The results of these experiments are shown below in Tables
5 and 6.
Table 5: Files found as a result of carving using the scalpel tool in Test One. Also indicated was whether the file could be
opened
Tool
File Type
No. Found Loadable
Total Size
dd
0
0
0MB
bmp 4-0
20
0
1.90MB
fws 10-0
1000
0
3.72GB
eraser
fws 10-1
893
0
3.32GB
mpg 9-0
1
0
6MB
png 3-0
8
0
84.4MB
ra 18-0
6
0
5.72MB
ra 19-0
2
0
1.9MB
tif 5-0
6
0
1.11GB
tif 6-0
8
0
1.48GB
wpc 13-0
1000
0
957MB
wpc 13-1
914
0
871MB
zip 20-0
8
0
840KB
7
0
683KB
sdelete bmp 4-0
mpg 9-0
10
0
26.5MB
fws 10-0
1000
0
3.42GB
fws
10-1
895
0
3.33GB
wipe
png 3-0
9
0
83.5MB
ra 18-0
7
0
6.67MB
ra 19-0
6
0
5.72MB
tif 5-0
7
0
1.3GB
tif 6-0
13
0
2.42GB
wpc 13-0
1000
0
957MB
wpc 13-1
868
0
827MB
zip 20-0
11
0
641KB
Significantly, as shown in both tables, while a number of files were carved, none of the carved files for any tools, in
either test were loadable, hence opened or viewed. And while the numbers found and total size of each file type carved
was different between the two tests, there were no noteworthy differences between the files carved from each tool
between test one (Table 6) and test two (Table 7).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
It appears that files cannot be recovered after a SSD has been securely wiped, even from the cache function used by
SSDs to delete data to create free space.
Furthermore, the most effective way to securely wipe a Solid State Drive so that no data can be carved or recovered from
the device is to use the DD application. As shown in both tables (table 6 & 7), no files were carved from the DD image in
either test. While DD can also be utilised in Windows environments, the second most effective tool was SDelete, which
works easily and effectively in the Windows Operating System environments. Scalpel was able to carve only 17 files
totalling just over 27MB from the SDelete image in test one (table 6) and 30 files totalling just over 40MB in test two
(table 7).
Last were Eraser and Wipe. From the Eraser image in test one Scalpel carved 3866 files, totalling 13925MB. From the
test two image Scalpel carved 384 files, totalling just under 11121MB. From the Wipe image in test one Scalpel carved
3816 files, totalling just over 12350MB. From the test two image Scalpel carved 3844 files, totalling over 9908MB.
While no carved files were totally recovered, a large amount of data was carved from each image.
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Table 6: Files found as a result of carving using the scalpel tool in Test One. Also indicated was whether the file could be
opened
Tool
dd
eraser

sdelete

wipe

File Type
bmp 4-0
fws 10-0
fws 10-1
mpg 9-0
png 3-0
ra 18-0
ra 19-0
tif 5-0
tif 6-0
wpc 13-0
wpc 13-1
zip 20-0
bmp 4-0
mpg 8-0
mpg 9-0
fws 10-0
fws 10-1
png 3-0
ra 18-0
ra 19-0
tif 5-0
tif 6-0
wpc 13-0
wpc 13-1
zip 20-0

No. Found
0
20
1,000
851
2
11
12
8
7
5
1000
924
9
8
8
14
1000
900
6
12
2
5
8
1000
900
11

Loadable
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Total Size
0
1.9MB
3.72GB
3.16GB
23MB
109MB
11.4MB
7.62MB
1.3GB
953MB
953MB
881MB
1.02MB
781KB
5.87MB
34.8MB
3.72GB
3.35GB
59.2MB
11.4MB
1.90MB
953MB
1.48GB
953MB
858MB
847KB

Solid State Drives (SSD) store data on NAND flash cells compared to platter-based Hard Drives (HDD), which means
the way data is read, written and deleted from a SSD is also different. SSDs utilise a SSD controller, which allows data to
be read and written to multiple die simultaneously and coordinates the removal of invalid data from NAND flash
memory only when more free space is required. Furthermore, SSDs use techniques such as wear-levelling and device
under provisioning to ensure all NAND flash cells are used and enough free space is available.
The main purpose of this paper was to discover if files could be recovered from securely deleted SSDs. While files could
be carved by Scalpel from the SSD after secure deletion by most tools, none of the carved files were loadable, or fully
recovered. Furthermore, the secondary purpose was to evaluate the efficiency of several secure deletion tools and
methods. The most effective was the GNU core utility DD, which removed all the data from the drive, while second was
the Windows application SDelete. Finally Wipe and Eraser were the least efficient, with thousands of carved files each.
Future research could be made into how much information was recoverable after being securely deleted or wiped by each
tool using more intrusive methods such as viewing each recoverable file in a hex-editor. Some meaningful information
may possibly be recovered using such methods. Such research could further verify which tools and methods are the most
effective for securely wiping Solid State Drives.
Additional further research could also be conducted into the TRIM function. This research has now created baselines
which can be used to test SSDs with TRIM functionality, including discovering if TRIM functionality affects or
improves the secure deletion of information off Solid State Drives.
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